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The Orwell Court: How the Supreme Court
Recast History and Minimized the Role of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to Justify
Limiting the Impact of Johnson v. United
States
“Who controls the past controls the future.
Who controls the present controls the past.”
– George Orwell, 1984

B RANDON E. BECK†
ABSTRACT
In recent years, federal criminal defendants have enjoyed great
success in challenging “residual clauses” within the United States
Code as unconstitutional. This began in 2015 when the United
States Supreme Court, in Johnson v. United States,1 struck a
portion of the Armed Career Criminal Act 2 as void for vagueness.
Johnson’s holding at first appeared monumental because it
invalidated a provision commonly used to enhance the prison
sentences of offenders with certain qualifying prior convictions.
Subsequent developments, however, significantly dulled the impact
of Johnson, thwarting the dramatic reduction in sentences it once
foreshadowed.
This Article is about how Johnson came to be and the
mechanisms through which the Supreme Court has subsequently
weakened Johnson’s effect. It will describe two specific mechanisms:
† Assistant Federal Public Defender for the Northern District of Texas, appellate
division, and Adjunct Professor at Texas Tech University School of Law.
1. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
2. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837,
2185 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).

1013

1014

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

(1) the Supreme Court’s recasting of the history of federal
sentencing in an attempt to contextualize the holding of Booker v.
United States 3 as a return to the bygone days of indeterminate
sentencing; and (2) the Supreme Court’s evolving view of the role of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in the federal
criminal system that minimizes the Guidelines’ actual influence
over a district court’s sentencing decisions. It will then explain why
these mechanisms—one that exerts control over the past and one
that exerts control over the present—are both unfounded. Finally,
this Article will suggest ways in which those involved in federal
criminal law—the United States Sentencing Commission
(Sentencing Commission), Congress, the courts, and the criminal
bar—can address the problems that the Court’s recent decisions
have caused in our criminal justice system.

I NTRODUCTION
In 2009 and 2012, respectively, Oscar Rash and Laneer
Everett found themselves in parallel legal circumstances.
Both were convicted of felonies in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin: Rash of a federal firearms offense 4 and Everett of
a federal drug trafficking offense.5 Both saw their sentences
increased under a federal recidivism provision based, in part,
on their prior state convictions for “vehicular flight”: Rash
under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act6
and Everett under an identically worded residual clause in
the Guidelines.7 Finally, both were sentenced to fifteen years

3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. Rash v. United States, No. 15-C-1485, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at
*1 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 23, 2015).
5. Everett v. United States, No. 17-CV -523-JPS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73642, at *2 (E.D. Wis. May 15, 2017).
6. Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *2. The Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA) residual clause defines “violent felony” as a prior felony conviction
that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018).
7. Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *2. The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual’s career-offender residual clause was identical to the ACCA
residual clause, defining “crime of violence” as a prior felony convict ion that
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL §§ 4B1.1, 4B1.2(a)(2) (U.S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 2011).
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imprisonment: Rash as an “armed career criminal”8 and
Everett as a “career offender.”9
As of 2011, neither Rash nor Everett had a path to
appellate relief because the United States Supreme Court
held, in Sykes v. United States, that vehicular flight was a
qualifying residual clause offense.10 Accordingly, they were
left with no choice but to serve their time. But in 2015, Rash
and Everett received a ray of hope. The Supreme Court
decided Johnson v. United States, which overruled Sykes and
struck the Armed Career Criminal Act residual clause as
void for vagueness.11 A year later, in Welch v. United States,
the Court made Johnson retroactive in cases on collateral
review.12 Both Rash and Everett filed motions, in the district
court, to vacate their sentences in light of Johnson because,
without a valid residual clause, their convictions for
vehicular flight no longer supported an enhanced sentence.13
Even though the Government conceded that armed
career criminals and career offenders were both entitled to
relief under Johnson,14 Rash and Everett experienced
different results. In the same jurisdiction, the district court
8. Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *1–2. An armed career criminal
is a federal firearms offender who has three qualifying prior convictions for either
a violent felony or a “serious drug offense.” See 18 U.S.C § 924(e)(1).
9. Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *2. A career offender is an
offender whose instant offense is either a “crime of violence” or “controlled
substance offense” and who has two qualifying prior conviction for either a crime
of violence or controlled substance offense. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL
§ 4B1.1.
10. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 27–28 (2011).
11. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
12. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
13. Motion to V acate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence by a Person in Federal
Custody, 28 U.S.C. 2255 at 6, Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642 (No. 17-CV523-JPS); Unopposed Petition to V acate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 at 1–
3, Rash, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320 (No. 15-C-1485).
14. See Brief for the United States at 40, Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
886 (2017) (No. 15-8544) (“In light of those basic purposes of the vagueness
doctrine, a district court’s use of a vague guideline to calculate an advisory
Guidelines range violates the Due Process Clause.”).
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vacated Rash’s sentence while denying Everett relief.15 The
reason for this disparate treatment was an intervening
decision from the Supreme Court, United States v. Beckles,
in which the Court held that the Guidelines are immune
from constitutional challenges for vagueness.16 Accordingly,
the same language, extrapolated from the Armed Career
Criminal Act to the Guidelines,17 led to divergent outcomes
for armed career criminals and career offenders. As a result,
Rash is now a free man while Everett continues to languish
in a federal penitentiary.18
This Article attempts to look beneath Johnson, Beckles,
and other decisions to identify the mechanisms through
which the Supreme Court determined the fates of defendants
like Rash and Everett. Part II explains how “armed career
criminals” and “career offenders” received disparate
treatment, even with the same prior convictions that
triggered an increased sentence through identically worded
provisions. Part III explains why this result was wrong both
from a historical perspective and with a full present
appreciation of the role of the Guidelines in the federal
sentencing scheme. Part IV suggests ways in which those
involved in federal criminal law—the Sentencing
Commission, Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar—

15. Compare Rash 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171320, at *2–3 (granting motion
and vacating sentence), with Everett, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73642, at *18–19
(denying motion).
16. Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 897 (“Because the advisory Sentencing Guidelines
are not subject to a due process vagueness challenge, § 4B1.2(a)’s residual clause
is not void for vagueness.”).
17. See U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, vol. I, amend. 268 (U.S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 2018) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”).
18. According to the Bureau of Prisons’ online “inmate locator,” Rash was
released from federal custody on September 9, 2016. Bureau of Prisons Inmate
Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS , https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (use the
“Find by Name” tab; then input “Oscar” in the first name field and “Rash” in the
last name field; then select “Search”). Everett is not due for release until
September 25, 2020. Id. (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Laneer” in the
first name field and “Everett” in the last name field; then select “Search”).
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can mitigate the harms that unconstitutional and
constitutionally questionable provisions cause to our
criminal justice system.
I. THE MINISTRY OF JUST RESULTS: JOHNSON , WELCH,
BECKLES, AND THE A RMED C AREER CRIMINAL A CT R ESIDUAL
CLAUSE
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act
On September 11, 1982, President Ronald Reagan gave
a radio address to the nation on crime and criminal justice
reform. He began his address with these remarks:
Today I want to talk with you about a subject that’s been very
much on my mind, even as we’ve been busy with budgets, interest
rates, and legislation. It’s a subject I know you’ve been thinking
about too—crime in our society.
Many of you have written to me how afraid you are to walk the
streets alone at night. We must make America safe again, especially
for women and elderly who face so many moments of fear. You have
every right to be concerned. We live in the midst of a crime epidemic
that took the lives of more than 22,000 people last year and has
touched nearly one-third of American households, costing them
about $8.8 billion per year in financial losses.
During the past decade alone, violent crime rose by nearly 60
percent. Study after study shows that most serious crimes are the
work of a relatively small group of hardened criminals. Let me give
you an example—subway crime in New York City. Transit police
there estimate that only 500 habitual criminal offenders are
responsible for nearly half the crimes in New York’s subways last
year.
It’s time to get these hardened criminals off the street and into
jail. The primary responsibility for dealing with these career
criminals must, of course, rest with local and State authorities. But
I want you to know that this administration, even as it has been
battling our economic problems, is taking important action on the
Federal level to fight crime. 19

In the same address, President Reagan proceeded to
express his intention to eliminate the parole system, limit
the application of the exclusionary rule, narrow the insanity

19. Radio Address to the Nation on Crime and Criminal Justice Reform, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1136 (Sept. 11, 1982).
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defense, increase forfeiture, revise the bail system, and push
other aggressive law-and-order reforms.20 This address was
one of many that foreshadowed the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984,21 one of the most significant criminal law
reforms in this country’s history. An integral component of
the Crime Control Act was the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), a three-strikes recidivism law that imposes harsh
mandatory minimums on repeat violent and drug offenders
who are caught illegally possessing a firearm.22 The ACCA is
the starting point for many discussions within federal
criminal law, and the effect of residual clauses on the federal
sentencing scheme is no exception.
1. Background and Purpose
The ACCA, like other aspects of Reagan-era reform, was
a product of its time. In the early 1980s, murder was at an
all-time high.23 There was heightened awareness, discussion,
and fear of “street violence.”24 The War on Drugs and the War
on Crime were at full ideological tilt.25 Congress and the
20. Id.
21. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837, 1976 (1984).
22. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837,
2185 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
23. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting statistics, there were
23,040 intentional or reckless homicides in the United States in 1980, which was
the highest annual total to date. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTING S TATISTICS : ESTIMATED CRIME IN 1980, https://www.bjs.gov
/ucrdata/Search/Crime/State/OneYearofData.cfm (select “United States-Total” in
box “a;” then select “Number of violent crimes” in box “b;” then select “1980” in
box “c;” then select “Get Table”).
24. See, e.g., Leonard Buder, 1980 Called Worst Year of Crime in City History,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/25/nyregion/1980called-worst-year-of-crime-in-city-history.html.
25. As Professor Susan Stuart explains:
Reagan’s direct references to the War on Drugs in official statements
and speeches surpassed President Ford’s by a factor of seven. Although
Reagan couched his War in terms of saving American lives, especially
children’s lives, his rhetoric nevertheless focused on taking the war to
the suppliers. Reagan’s allusions to war tactics were often less than
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American people were willing to tolerate aggressive anticrime reforms, even those that exacerbated mass
incarceration and disproportionately affected minorities. 26
Yet passage of the ACCA was complicated because, at the
same time, politicians were wary of giving the federal
government jurisdiction over traditionally local activities,
even activities such as prosecuting violent criminals.27
The ACCA was the brainchild of Senator Arlen Specter,
who first introduced it in 1981 to criminalize the state crimes
of armed burglary and armed robbery at the federal level.28
The punishment would be a mandatory minimum sentence
of fifteen years, up to life in prison, for offenders who had two
qualifying prior convictions.29 Senator Specter was the
subtle, using terms like “battlefield,” “military intelligence,” “the
deployment of the armed forces,” “battle,” and “crusade.” Perhaps
Reagan was no more warrior-like than in his tribute to law enforcement
officers slain during the War on Drugs . . . .
Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 9 (2011)
(footnotes omitted). While President Johnson first declared the War on Crime, it
evolved through President Nixon, President Carter, and finally President Reagan
to symbolize a more prominent death penalty as well as the abandonment of the
exclusionary rule and Miranda protections. Jonathan Simon, Gun Rights and the
Constitutional Significance of Violent Crime, 12 WM . & M ARY B ILL OF RTS. J. 335,
340–51 (2004) (discussing the War on Crime).
26. See generally Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus
Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER
RACE & J UST. 381, 381–82 (2002).
27. For a great description of the federalism concerns about granting cojurisdiction over violent crime to the federal government, see Daniel Richman,
The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 C RIME & JUST. 377,
393 (2006).
28. Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981, S. 1688, 97th Cong. (1981);
Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 1688, S. 1689, and S.
1690 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
97th Cong. 3–4 (1981). For a discussion of the ACCA’s early legislative history,
see United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 679 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
29. Senator Spector’s bill originally punished “armed career criminals” with
a mandatory sentence of life in prison. But in light of data demonstrating that
recidivism rates decrease after an offender turns thirty, Senator Specter revised
his bill, lowering the mandatory minimum to fifteen years imprisonment. James
G. Levine, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act and the U.S. Sentencing
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former elected District Attorney of Philadelphia and had
come to believe that the federal government should play a
larger role in the prosecution of traditionally state crimes. 30
Many disagreed, including President Reagan, who pocketvetoed the bill in 1983.31 Senator Specter, along with thenCongressman Ron Wyden, reintroduced the bill, which
Congressman William Hughes then amended to allay
federalism concerns by limiting the triggering instant
offense to a pre-existing federal gun crime.32 Meanwhile, the
threshold number of qualifying prior convictions was
increased from two to three.33
The original purpose of the ACCA was not to
dramatically increase federal prosecutions of repeat
offenders but to create the possibility of a harsh federal
sentence in order to pressure offenders to promptly plead
guilty to state charges, known as the principle of
“leveraging.”34 With the ACCA in place, the theory went, less
than one-percent of eligible offenders would actually need to
be prosecuted to send the appropriate signal to the rest of the
criminal element. The ACCA’s champion, Senator Specter,
explained it before Congress as follows:
If the career criminal bill were in place, it would be possible for a
district attorney, like the district attorney of Philadelphia, to refer
a few cases—3, 4, or 5, out of 500—where there would be the
individual judge’s calendar, a trial within 90 days, strong cases,
Guidelines: Moving Toward Consistency, 46 HARV . J.
(2009).

ON

LEGIS . 537, 545–46

30. For a description of Senator Specter’s views, see Arlen Specter & Paul R.
Michel, The Need for a New Federalism in Criminal Justice, 462 ANNALS A M.
ACAD. POL. & S OC. S CI. 59, 59–71 (1982).
31. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 680. (“S.1688 was passed by both Houses of
Congress as part of a larger package, but President Reagan pocket-vetoed it. The
President’s objection to this aspect of the package concerned the relationship
between federal and local prosecutors.”).
32. Levine, supra note 29, at 546–47.
33. See id. at 547.
34. For a more developed discussion of “leveraging” and the ACCA, see James
E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 M ICH. L. REV . 1951, 1959–61 (1991).
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virtually certain convictions, and minimum mandatory sentences of
15 years to life.
I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that if that happened to a few of
Philadelphia’s career criminals, there would be a mass rush for
guilty pleas in the State courts, and that it is not optimistic to
predict that 300 or 400 of the balance of those 500 cases would result
in guilty pleas, and not with sentences of 15 years to life but with
sentences of 10 years, or 12 years, much more than is being obtained
at the present time. It is that leveraging which we really seek to
accomplish through the career criminal bill. 35

Whether Senator Spector’s stated intent of leveraging
was sincere or merely to assuage President Reagan’s (and
others’) federalism concerns, it worked: President Reagan
signed the ACCA into law, as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act, on October 12, 1984.36
2. Text and Application
In its present form,37 the ACCA imposes a mandatory
minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment on
offenders who commit a federal gun crime and have three or
more prior convictions that qualify as a “violent felony” or
“serious drug offense”:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and
has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony
or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different
from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than

35. Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 13 (1984)
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
36. See Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat 1837,
2185 (1984).
37. The last major revision to the ACCA was the requirement that the prior
convictions must have been “committed on occasions different from one another.”
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402
(1988). This clarifying language was Congress’s reaction to the Eighth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157, 1159–60 (8th Cir. 1986), which
affirmed the ACCA enhancement for a man who had been previously convicted,
under a single indictment, of six counts of robbery, which were committed against
six different people at a restaurant simultaneously. See Hooper, supra note 34,
at 1965–66.
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fifteen years[.]38

The ACCA, in turn, defines violent felony as follows:
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that—
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another. 39

Textually, the ACCA’s definition of violent felony
comprises two subsections; courts, however, have analyzed it
as three separate clauses: the elements clause; the
enumerated offenses; and the residual clause:
Elements clause

has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the
person of another; or

Enumerated
offenses

is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or

Residual clause

otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.

A prior conviction need only satisfy one clause to qualify
as a violent felony.40 And while each clause harbors its own
set of legal considerations, the most nettlesome portion of the
definition, and the focus of this discussion, has been the
ACCA residual clause.

38. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018).
39. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
40. See United States v. Schmidt, 623 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The
ACCA has three disjunctive prongs, under any one of which an offense may be
deemed a crime of violence.”).

2018]

THE ORWELL COURT

1023

B. How the ACCA Residual Clause Met Its Fate
Since its enactment, the fourteen-word ACCA residual
clause has been a bête noire of both defendants and the
judiciary. From 2007 to 2015, the United States Supreme
Court heard six arguments on its application, expressing an
increasing degree of frustration with each decision. As
Justice Scalia sarcastically remarked in 2011, “[w]e try to
include an ACCA residual-clause case in about every second
or third volume of the United States Reports.”41
1. Ex-Ante Johnson
The Court’s decisions during this period were ad hoc and
scattershot. In 2007, the Court held in James that Florida’s
attempted burglary statute satisfied the ACCA residual
clause.42 In 2008, the Court held in Begay that New Mexico’s
felony “DUI statute” did not satisfy the ACCA residual
clause.43 In 2009, the Court held in Chambers that Illinois’s
“failure to report for imprisonment” statute did not satisfy
the ACCA residual clause.44 In 2011, the Court held in Sykes
that Indiana’s vehicular flight statute satisfied the ACCA
residual clause.45 Finally, in 2015, after hearing argument
twice in Johnson v. United States, the Court threw up its
hands and held that the ACCA residual clause is void for
vagueness.46 In doing so, however, the Court was careful to
preserve the remaining portions of the ACCA definition of
violent felony.47 But the impact of Johnson’s holding cannot
be overstated: the Court definitively excised one of the most

41. Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 28 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007).
43. Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008).
44. Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125, 130 (2009).
45. Sykes, 564 U.S. at 27–28.
46. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–57 (2015).
47. Id. at 2563. (“Today’s decision does not call into question application of
the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act’s definition
of a violent felony.”).
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commonly applied prior-conviction-enhancement provisions
and laid the groundwork for challenging the constitutionality
of other remaining residual clauses, both in the United
States Code and the Guidelines. Johnson’s reasoning is,
however, more subtle and complex than its holding suggests,
and requires close examination to evaluate its application
across the federal criminal landscape.
2. Johnson v. United States
It would be a mistake to ascribe Johnson’s holding—that
the ACCA’s residual clause is void for vagueness—to
Congress’s poor choice of words that presented uncertainties
in application.48 To be certain, courts apply vague—in the
non-technical sense—provisions all the time: our own
Constitution, for example, is full of them.49 Moreover, courts
impose
a
strong
presumption
against
facial
unconstitutionality when construing statutes.50 In truth, the
holding of Johnson would not have been reached had it not
been for the analytical framework, known as the “categorical
approach,” through which courts interpret the ACCA and
other similar statutes. In this regard, the real story of
Johnson begins twenty-five years earlier with Taylor v.
United States, a case in which the Supreme Court was
struggling to interpret not the ACCA residual clause but its
enumerated offense of “burglary.”51

48. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 897 (2017) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[That something is] vague in a general sense—that is to say,
imprecise or unclear . . . does not necessarily mean that it is vague within the
well-established legal meaning of that term.”).
49. Reasonable minds differ, for example, on the precise breadth of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” Compare Glossip
v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2746–50 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 2755–
77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953)
(“This Court does and should accord a strong presumption of constitutionality to
Acts of Congress.”).
51. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
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a. Taylor’s Categorical Approach
When Arthur Lejuane Taylor pleaded guilty to being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm in January of 1988,
he had four prior convictions, all under Missouri law: (1)
robbery; (2) assault; and (3–4) two convictions for seconddegree burglary.52 When prosecutors sought to enhance
Taylor’s sentencing exposure to a fifteen year mandatory
minimum under the ACCA, Taylor conceded that his robbery
and assault convictions qualified as violent felonies under
the ACCA residual clause but disputed whether his two
burglary convictions qualified under any clause.53 The
district court overruled Taylor’s objections and sentenced
him to fifteen years imprisonment.54 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, joining two other circuits in holding that burglary
in the ACCA enumerated offenses meant burglary “however
a state chooses to define it.”55 Others circuits, however, were
taking a different approach: some treated burglary as
common law burglary,56 while others continued to apply the
ACCA’s absent definition of burglary 57 that Congress
inexplicably removed in 1986.58
The Court ultimately settled on a meaning for burglary
closest to the ACCA’s 1984 definition, which the Court called
“generic” burglary, meaning burglary in its contemporary
52. Id. at 578.
53. Id. at 579.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 579–80, 580 n.2. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625, 627
(8th Cir. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Leonard, 868 F.2d
1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1223–24
(8th Cir. 1988).
56. E.g., United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 757–58 (4th Cir. 1988).
57. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1023 (6th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Palmer,
871 F.2d 1202, 1205–09 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575,
1581–83 (11th Cir. 1989).
58. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 582 (“The legislative history is silent as to Congress’
reason for deleting the definition of burglary.”).
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sense.59 For absolute clarity, the Court expressly defined
generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into,
or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to
commit a crime.”60 This formulation, henceforth, is what the
ACCA and other prior-conviction-enhancement provisions
mean by burglary.61 Now that the Court had solved the
problem of defining burglary, it faced a new quandary: how
to evaluate whether a prior conviction meets or satisfies that
definition. The Court addressed this problem by creating the
formal categorical approach.62
The formal categorical approach, in its most
straightforward application, holds that if the elements of a
statute of prior conviction are the same as the elements of
the generic offense—in Taylor, generic burglary—then the
prior conviction counts toward the enhancement.63 In more
concrete terms, if a defendant is charged with a firearms
offense and has a prior conviction for burglary, the court
must examine the elements of the particular burglary
statute for which the defendant was previously convicted, at
the time of his conviction.64 If that statute has, as its basic
elements, “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to
commit a crime,” then the prior conviction matches generic
burglary and would therefore qualify as a violent felony
toward the ACCA enhancement. If two more prior
convictions qualify as either a violent felony or serious drug
offense, then the defendant would be enhanced under the

59. Id. at 598 (“Congress meant by ‘burglary’ the generic sense in which the
term is now used in the criminal codes of most States.”).
60. Id.
61. The Supreme Court most recently applied the Taylor definition of generic
burglary in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016).
62. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–602.
63. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013).
64. McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816, 820 (2011) (“The only way to
answer [the ACCA’s] backward-looking question is to consult the law that applied
at the time of that conviction.”).
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ACCA to a fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence.65 This
would be true even if the state did not call the crime
burglary.66
Moreover, if the statute of prior conviction is narrower
than the generic offense—meaning it criminalizes less
conduct than its generic counterpart—then the conviction
likewise counts toward the enhancement.67 But if the statute
of prior conviction is broader—meaning it criminalizes a
broader swath of conduct, in any way—then the statute can
never support an enhancement.68 As Justice Kagan so
evocatively explained in Descamps v. United States,
“Congress . . . meant [the] ACCA to function as an on-off
switch, directing that a prior crime would qualify as a
predicate offense in all cases or in none.”69 That is because,
under the categorical approach, courts are only to consider
the elements of the offense of prior conviction, never the
actual conduct of the offender that led to the conviction.70

65. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2018).
66. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–602 (“[T]here may be offenses under some States’
laws that, while not called ‘burglary,’ correspond in substantial part to generic
burglary.”).
67. Id. at 599. See also Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257 (“The prior conviction
qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or
narrower than, those of the generic offense.”).
68. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). See also Descamps,
570 U.S. at 268 (“Congress . . . meant [the] ACCA to function as an on-off switch,
directing that a prior crime would qualify as a predicate offense in all cases or in
none.”).
69. 570 U.S. at 268.
70. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248. The Court explained:
Facts, by contrast, are mere real-world things—extraneous to the
crime’s legal requirements. (We have sometimes called them “brute
facts” when distinguishing them from elements.) They are
“circumstance[s]” or “event[s]” having no “legal effect [or] consequence”:
In particular, they need neither be found by a jury nor admitted by a
defendant. And ACCA, as we have always understood it, cares not a whit
about them.
Id. (alterations and in original) (citations omitted).
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b. The Problem of Imagining the Ordinary Case
While Taylor created the categorical approach to deal
directly with the ACCA enumerated offenses, the approach
applies equally to all clauses within the ACCA’s definition of
violent felony,71 including the prohibition on peeking into an
offender’s actual prior conduct.72 Accordingly, if a defendant
has a prior conviction for, say, driving while intoxicated,
courts cannot examine the specific nature of the conduct
surrounding that conviction when deciding whether it
satisfies the residual clause.73 Instead, before Johnson,
courts were left with the difficult task of examining the
elements of the statute of prior conviction and then
estimating the degree of risk involved in that crime’s
imagined “ordinary case.”74 It is this process of
imagination—a direct result of the categorical approach—
that proved ultimately unworkable. In Johnson, the
defendant’s prior conviction in question was for possession of
a short-barreled shotgun.75 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, highlighted the difficulties of imagination:
The present case, our fifth about the meaning of the residual clause,
opens a new front of uncertainty. When deciding whether unlawful

71. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562 (2015) (“ Taylor had
good reasons to adopt the categorical approach, reasons that apply no less to the
residual clause than to the enumerated crimes.”).
72. See id. (“[Taylor’s] emphasis on convictions indicates that ‘Congress
intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been
convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts
underlying the prior convictions.’”) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).
73. E.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141 (2008) (applying the
categorical approach to look only at the elements of the prior offense when
evaluating whether driving while intoxicated satisfies the ACCA residual clause).
74. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court worried:
[T]he residual clause leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the
risk posed by a crime. It ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially
imagined ‘ordinary case’ of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory
elements. How does one go about deciding what kind of conduct the
‘ordinary case’ of a crime involves?
Id.
75. Id. at 2556.
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possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony, do we
confine our attention to the risk that the shotgun will go off by
accident while in someone’s possession? Or do we also consider the
possibility that the person possessing the shotgun will later use it
to commit a crime? The inclusion of burglary and extortion among
the enumerated offenses suggests that a crime may qualify under
the residual clause even if the physical injury is remote from the
criminal act. But how remote is too remote? Once again, the residual
clause yields no answers. 76

Of all the talk of legal imagination, one fact required no
imagination: without the ability to examine specific conduct,
not only the United States Supreme Court but also lower
courts were hopelessly divided on how to classify common
crimes through the ACCA residual clause.77 Even worse,
courts below could not even agree on “the nature of the
inquiry” and “the kinds of factors one is supposed to
consider.”78 Circuit splits abounded and consistency among
the district courts was likely even more lacking.79 In the eyes
of the majority, if any semblance of uniformity were to be
reinstated, there was but one choice: the ACCA residual
clause had to go.80 Thus, on June 26, 2015, the Court held in
Johnson that the ACCA residual clause violates the
Constitution’s guarantee of due process, specifically its

76. Id. at 2559.
77. Id. at 2559–60.
78. Id. at 2560.
79. See id. at 2559–60 (“This Court is not the only one that has had trouble
making sense of the residual clause. The clause has ‘created numerous splits
among the lower federal courts,’ where it has proved ‘nearly impossible to apply
consistently.’”) (quoting Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (20 09)
(Alito, J., concurring)).
80. See id. at 2562–63. The Court reasoned:
Although it is a vital rule of judicial self-government, stare decisis does
not matter for its own sake. It matters because it “promotes the
evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal
principles.” Decisions under the residual clause have proved to be
anything but evenhanded, predictable, or consistent. Standing by James
and Sykes would undermine, rather than promote, the goals that stare
decisis is meant to serve.
Id. at 2563 (citation omitted).
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prohibition of vague criminal laws.81 Almost exactly one year
later, in Welch v. United States, the Court held that Johnson
was retroactive in cases on collateral review.82
C. How the ACCA Residual Clause Lives on by a Different
Name
The holdings of Johnson and Welch opened the door for
relief to an enormous number of inmates sentenced under
the ACCA, many of whom had already served more time than
their current convictions allowed by law.83 This returns us to
the Introduction’s real-world scenario: how did Rash enjoy
the benefit of Johnson and Welch while Everett was left to
serve his full, enhanced sentence when both of their
sentencing enhancements were triggered by the same prior
conviction (vehicular flight) under an identically worded
residual clause? The answer to this question has to do with
the Supreme Court’s view of the nature of the Guidelines and
the role they play in federal sentencing. But first, the
Guidelines provision at issue: the career-offender definition
of “crime of violence.”84
1. The Career Offender Guideline
The Sentencing Commission created the career offender
enhancement at Congress’s direction. As part of the
81. Id. at 2560, 2563 (“Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone
to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution’s guarantee
of due process.”).
82. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (“Johnson, however,
struck down part of a criminal statute that regulates conduct and prescribes
punishment. It thereby altered ‘the range of conduct or the class of persons that
the law punishes.’ It follows that Johnson announced a substantive rule that has
retroactive effect in cases on collateral review.”) (citation omitted).
83. The instant offense that triggers the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018), has
a statutory maximum of ten years imprisonment if the ACCA does not apply. Id.
§ 924(a)(2). Because the ACCA carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum, all
improperly enhanced offenders would necessarily be serving an “illegal
sentence.” See United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir. 2017).
84. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 4B1.2(a) (U.S. S ENTENCING
COMM ’N 2015).
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(h), which directed the newly formed Sentencing
Commission to create a Guidelines provision that punishes
certain repeat offenders “to a term of imprisonment at or
near the maximum term authorized.”85 The Sentencing
Commission thus drafted Guidelines Section 4B1.1, the
career offender Guideline, and Section 4B1.2, its definitions
provision.86
In its original incarnation, effective 1987, the career
offender Guideline did not have its own, independent
definition of crime of violence but simply cross-referenced the
statutory definition found in 18 U.S.C. § 16.87 It likewise did
not provide a formal definition of “controlled substance
offense” but rather listed several statutes that satisfied the
term along with other “similar offenses.”88 A major change
came in 1989 when the Sentencing Commission adopted the
Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of violent felony,
including its residual clause, as the career offender definition
of crime of violence.89 Meanwhile, the Sentencing
Commission used the Guidelines commentary to identify
specific generic offenses that did or did not qualify as a crime
of violence.90 This was the form of the career offender
85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2018).
86. See U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 4B1.1–.2 (U.S. S ENTENCING
COMM ’N 1987).
87. Id. § 4B1.2(1) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ as used in this provision is
defined under 18 U.S.C. § 16.”).
88. Id. § 4B1.2(2) (“The term ‘controlled substance offense’ as used in this
provision means an offense identified in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 952(a), 955, 955a, 959;
§§ 405B and 416 of the Controlled Substance Act as amended in 1986, and similar
offenses.”).
89. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, amend. 268 (U.S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 1989) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”).
90. E.g., U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (U.S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 2015) (“‘Crime of violence’ includes murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion,
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.”); see also id. (“‘Crime
of violence’ does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a
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Guideline when the Supreme Court decided Johnson.91
2. Beckles v. United States
Although Rash was sentenced as an armed career
criminal, enhanced under the United States Code, and
Everett was sentenced as a career offender, enhanced under
the Guidelines,92 these differences would not have seemed
significant at the time of Johnson because the career
offender residual clause was textually identical to the ACCA
residual clause: “or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 93 In
fact, the Sentencing Commission expressly modeled the
career offender Guideline after the ACCA.94 As such, both
the Government and criminal defendants agreed, at the
time, that the ACCA and career offender residual clauses
shared the same fate under Johnson.95
Johnson’s effect on the career offender Guideline was
anticipated to benefit a larger number of offenders because,
although it defined its terms almost identically to the ACCA,
the career offender Guideline has a broader application than
the ACCA: the career offender enhancement requires only
two qualifying predicate offenses and the triggering instant
felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a).”).
91. A subsequent major change to Section 4B1.2 came in 2016 when the
Sentencing Commission removed the Section 4B1.2(a)(2) residual clause in light
of Johnson and, at the same time, elevated a lengthy enumerated list of
qualifying generic offenses from the commentary to the actual text of the
Guideline. See U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798
(U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N 2016).
92. See supra Introduction.
93. Compare U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (U. S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 2011), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b) (2012).
94. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, amend. 268 (U.S.
S ENTENCING C OMM ’N 1989) (“The definition of crime of violence used in this
amendment is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”).
95. See Brief for the United States at 38–40, Beckles v. United States, 137 S.
Ct. 886 (2017) (No. 15-8544) (“In light of those basic purposes of the vagueness
doctrine, a district court’s use of a vague guideline to calculate an advisory
Guidelines range violates the Due Process Clause.”).
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offense can be any crime of violence or controlled substance
offense rather than the narrower range of offenses under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g).96 Moreover, depending on how events
unfolded, even more offenders were potentially affected
because a slew of other Guidelines provisions crossreferenced the career-offender definition of crime of violence,
including its residual clause.97 Because the Government and
Beckles both agreed that Section 4B1.2’s residual clause did
not survive Johnson, the Court appointed an amicus curiae
to argue for keeping the Guidelines provision intact.98
The general issue in Beckles was Johnson’s application
to the career offender residual clause.99 The specific,
constitutional issue was whether the Guidelines, by their
advisory nature, are ever subject to a vagueness challenge
under the Due Process Clause.100 Justice Thomas, writing for
the majority, began by explaining that, under precedent, two
types of laws are vulnerable to a constitutional vagueness
challenge: (1) laws that define criminal offenses; and (2) laws
that fix the permissible sentences for defendants.101 In
96. The Guideline states:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N
2018).
97. Specifically, Guidelines Section 2K1.3 (offenses involving explosive
materials), Section 2K2.1 (offenses involving firearms), Section 2S1.1 (money
laundering), Section 4A1.1(e) (computation of criminal history category), Section
4B1.1 (career offender enhancement), and Section 4B1.4 (armed career criminal
enhancement) all increase a defendant’s base offense level if a prior conviction
satisfies one or more of the Section 4B1.2 definitions. Id. §§ 2K1.3, 2K2.1, 2S1.1,
4A1.1(e), 4B1.1, 4B1.4.
98. Beckles, 137 S. Ct at 892.
99. Id. at 890–92.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 892.
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Beckles, the Court explained that in Johnson, it struck the
ACCA residual clause as the second type because it did not
“specify the range of available sentences with sufficient
clarity,” increasing a defendant’s term of imprisonment from
a ten year maximum to a fifteen year minimum based on
unascertainable language.102 But as Justice Thomas
explained, the Guidelines do not fix sentences; instead, after
Booker, they merely “guide the exercise of a court’s discretion
in choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory
range.”103 Therefore, because the Guidelines cannot be
challenged as vague under the Due Process Clause, the Court
held that the career-offender residual clause cannot be void
for vagueness.104
In light of Johnson, Rash was released from federal
custody on September 9, 2016.105 In light of Beckles, Everett
is not set for release until September 25, 2020.106 Although
this seems patently unfair, fairness is rarely, if ever, a
dispositive inquiry in federal sentencing law. The problem
actually lurks much deeper, in the undercurrent of Beckles’s
historical assumptions and its mischaracterization of the
current role that the Guidelines play in federal sentencing
practice. Part III will explore this terrain.
III. THE MINISTRY OF TRUTH: BECKLES, BOOKER, BAD
HISTORY, AND MISCHARACTERIZING THE ROLE THAT THE
SENTENCING GUIDELINES PLAY IN THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
SCHEME
The holding of Beckles closed the door for relief to
defendants whose base offense level was increased through
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Oscar”
in the first name field and “Rash” in the last name field; then select “Search”).
106. Id. (use the “Find by Name” tab; then input “Laneer” in the first name
field and “Everett” in the last name field; then select “Search”).
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the residual clause of the career-offender Guideline. The
sentences of career offenders remained while many armed
career criminals were seeing their sentences vacated, even
with the same criminal history. All the while, the Supreme
Court made assurances that the disparate treatment of these
categories of offenders was on sound constitutional footing.
The Court, however, reached this conclusion based on two
mischaracterizations: a historical mischaracterization of the
impact of United States v. Booker on the federal sentencing
scheme; and a present mischaracterization of the role of the
Guidelines in federal sentencing today. This confluence of
mischaracterizations formed a false narrative that the
Guidelines offer “mere guidance” in our system, thus
inoculating them from vagueness concerns and preserving
the sentences of career offenders in light of Johnson.107
The reasoning of Beckles is rooted not in the text of the
Guidelines’ residual clause but in the Supreme Court’s
understanding of the impact of Booker on federal sentencing.
Beckles depends upon one fundamental premise: that
Booker’s twin holdings, in large part, returned the federal
criminal sentencing scheme to one of indeterminate
sentencing, as it was prior to the imposition of the
Guidelines.108 In doing so, the Court grossly understated the
role that the advisory Guidelines continue to play in federal
sentencing after Booker. Certain aspects of the role of

107. See Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 892. In Beckles, the Court promulgated:
Unlike the ACCA, however, the advisory Guidelines do not fix the
permissible range of sentences. To the contrary, they merely guide the
exercise of a court’s discretion in choosing an appropriate sentence
within the statutory range. Accordingly, the Guidelines are not subject
to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. The residual
clause in § 4B1.2(a)(2) therefore is not void for vagueness.
Id. (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 893–94 (“The Guidelines were initially binding on district
courts, but this Court in Booker rendered them ‘effectively advisory.’ . . . The
Guidelines thus continue to guide district courts in exercising their discretion by
serving as ‘the framework for sentencing,’ but they ‘do not constrain that
discretion.’”) (alteration and citations omitted).
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advisory Guidelines in federal sentencing were perhaps
unforeseeable to the Court in Booker, but were certainly
known by the time the Court decided Beckles. In short, the
holding of Beckles is as good as its history, and Beckles’s
evolved historical understanding of Booker’s impact and the
current role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing led the
Court down a misguided path with ongoing consequences.
A. Contextualizing United States v. Booker: A Short
History of Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing
Because the federal court system covers such a wide
range of territory, with diverse regional views of justice, it
has been plagued, since inception, with the problem of
sentencing disparity. Liberal and conservative critics alike
have historically called for more sentencing uniformity—
even if for different reasons.109 As a result, the federal
sentencing scheme has undergone a series of changes over
time with an eye toward reducing disparity by limiting a
district court’s ability to decide how much time a defendant
will actually serve in prison. These efforts have benefitted
offenders, on the one hand, by vesting decision-making
power with bodies other than Congress and the judiciary that
can mitigate overly long sentences of imprisonment. They
have been a detriment to offenders, on the other hand, when
Congress has protected against overly lenient sentences by
imposing mandatory minimum sentences, reducing goodtime credit, and eliminating parole. Either way, whether fair
or not, judicial discretion has been squarely blamed for
sentencing disparity and has, in some form or another, been
the target of these changes. These developments are
important to consider because courts’ understandings of the
nature, history, and extent of judicial sentencing discretion
have, in recent years, played a critical role in how those
courts have evaluated the impact of a successful statutory
109. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. R EV .
223, 227–28 (1993).

2018]

THE ORWELL COURT

1037

void-for-vagueness challenge.
1. Sentencing Before the Guidelines (origin–1987)
a. A System of Indeterminate Sentencing
At the outset of our federal criminal system, the only two
players in the sentencing game were Congress and the
federal district courts. Congress would set the statutory
sentencing range for each federal crime (a statutory
maximum and sometimes a mandatory minimum), which
was often very wide, and district courts were free to impose
a sentence anywhere within that range.110 This “system of
indeterminate sentencing” included decisions regarding the
length of incarceration and whether probation should
substitute for a sentence of imprisonment or a fine.111 And
because sentencing decisions, at the time, enjoyed little or no
appellate review,112 this wide discretion brought equally
wide sentencing disparity.113

110. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363–64 (1989) (“For almost a
century, the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of
indeterminate sentencing. Statutes specified the penalties for crimes but nearly
always gave the sentencing judge wide discretion . . . .”).
111. Id. at 363.
112. See Freeman v. United States, 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917) (“ [T]he
question of the nature of the sentence was one which rested in the discretion of
the court below, a discretion which will not be reviewed in this court in any case
where the punishment assessed is within the statutory limits.”).
113. In January 1960, The Atlantic published an article by United States
District Court Judge Irving R. Kaufman in which the Judge illustrated the
problem:
[T]he average sentence for auto theft in the federal courts of eastern
Oklahoma was thirty-six months, while in New Hampshire the average
commitment for the same crime was less than a year. . . . [And], the
average prison sentence meted out in the federal courts ranged from 9
months in V ermont to 58 months in southern Iowa. . . . [T]he disparity
in different sentences for the same offense seems unfair.
Irving R. Kaufman, Sentencing: The Judge’s Problem, ATLANTIC M ONTHLY, Jan.
1960, at 40.
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b. “Good Conduct Time”
The first significant effort to mitigate the harsh effects of
wide judicial sentencing discretion came on March 3, 1875,
when Congress passed legislation providing inmates with a
credited reduction to their sentences for time with “no charge
of misconduct” or “good conduct time.”114 The original version
of this good-time statute gave inmates a five day reduction
in their overall sentence for each month they did not receive
a charge of misconduct.115 These rules were changed from
time to time, for most of their history, to increase an
offender’s good-time credit. For example, on June 25, 1948,
Congress refined the good conduct time computation rules,
crediting inmates with up to ten days per month on
sentences of ten years or more.116 For much of its history, up
until 1984,117 good conduct time remained at this level.118
c. The Federal Parole System
Congress’s next significant step came on June 25, 1910,
114. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 145, 18 Stat. 479.
115. Id.
116. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 4161, 62 Stat. 683, 853.
Specifically, an inmate would receive credit for: (1) five days per month on a
sentence of six months to one year imprisonment; (2) six days per month on a
sentence of more than one year and less than three years imprisonment; (3) seven
days per month on a sentence of at least three years and less than five years
imprisonment; (4) eight days per month on a sentence at least five years and less
than ten years imprisonment; and (5) ten days per month on a sentence ten years
imprisonment or more. Id. These credits, of course, assumed that the inmate had
“faithfully observed all the rules and ha[d] not been subjected to punishment”
that month. Id.
117. In the time after the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, described more fully
below, Congress has dramatically reduced the amount of good time available—to
54 days per year—while simultaneously making the credit more difficult to earn,
requiring a full year of “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary
regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2018). Any violation will generally result in
no good conduct credit awarded for the year. Id. (“[I]f the Bureau determines that,
during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such
institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service
of the prisoner’s sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the Bureau
determines to be appropriate.”).
118. See Stith & Koh, supra note 109, at 226 n.10.
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when it enacted legislation implementing a system of parole
for federal prisoners.119 This new system provided an
opportunity for release, under the “guidance and control” of
a corrections official,120 to federal inmates who were
sentenced to more than a year imprisonment and had served
at least one-third of their total sentence.121 Congress
entrusted the decision of whether to release an inmate on
parole to each prison’s new parole board, which would review
eligible inmates’ behavior while incarcerated and evaluate
whether there was a reasonable probability that the inmate
“will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws.” 122
This new system curbed a district court’s ability to control
the actual length of a defendant’s time in prison, which could,
at that time, be reduced by up to two-thirds. Congress then
created a centralized United States Board of Parole (later the
Parole Commission) in 1930, which provided oversight of the
individual federal prison boards.123 Still, disparities in the
actual length of incarceration remained common.124
d. The United States Parole Commission
In 1976, Congress passed the Parole Commission and
Reorganization Act, which sought to systemize how federal
parole boards evaluated inmates.125 This Act created a ninemember United States Parole Commission (Parole
Commission), within the Department of Justice, tasked with
crafting guidelines to govern whether an inmate’s

119. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-269, 36 Stat. 819.
120. See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 363 (1938).
121. Act of June 25, 1910 § 1.
122. Id. §§ 2–3.
123. Act of May 13, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-202, 46 Stat. 272. See also U.S.A. ex
rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156, 1167 (3d Cir. 1985) (“In 1930, Congress
created the United States Board of Parole.”).
124. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364–66 (1989).
125. Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 94-233, sec. 2,
§§ 4201–4218, 90 Stat. 219, 219–231(1976).
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application for parole should be granted or denied.126 The
stated goal was threefold: (1) to establish a national paroling
policy; (2) to increase consistency; and (3) to create a fairer
decision-making process while still allowing for case-by-case
consideration.127 In short, Congress sought to decrease
regional disparity in the actual amount of time similarly
situated inmates served in federal prison.
The parole guidelines evaluated inmates based on their
offense of conviction as well as their past criminal conduct,
which were then reduced to numerical values.128 These two
values formed the x- and y-axes of a grid, which ultimately
recommended a range of imprisonment in months.129 These
parole guidelines are the clear predecessor to the Guidelines
that have come to drive so many sentencing decisions
thereafter.130 The parole guidelines also demonstrated a
desire for uniformity and fairness: uniformity by way of
systematic guidance; fairness by way of an executive-branch
agency that could mitigate harsh exercises of judicial
discretion. Just as with good conduct time, Congress
drastically changed course in 1984.
e. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
The Sentencing Reform Act,131 part of the larger

126. Id. sec. 2, §§ 4202–03. It is speculated the Parole Commission was using
informal “pilot” guidelines as early as 1972. Brent E. Newton & Dawinder S.
Sidhu, The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–
1987, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV . 1167, 1171 n.27 (2017).
127. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20(a) (1986).
128. See id. § 2.20(b)–(e).
129. See id. § 2.20(j); Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126, at 172.
130. Although more simplistic, the parole guidelines bore the same structure
as the future sentencing guidelines and were even drafted by Peter Hoffman, a
future staffer for the Sentencing Commission. Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126,
at 1171–73.
131. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) (the Act was held in
abeyance during the drafting of the Guidelines and therefore did not become
applicable until 1987).
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Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,132 was the first of
two watershed events in the history of modern federal
sentencing law, and arguably remains the most
significant.133 With one stroke of the President’s pen, the Act
abolished the federal parole system, dramatically reduced
the availability of good conduct time, and created the
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency within the
judicial branch.134 This new Sentencing Commission was
tasked with promulgating mandatory guidelines for
sentencing, which would bind judicial sentencing discretion.
The intricacies of the legislative history and the political
context in which the Act arose are complex and fascinating,
but beyond the scope of this article.135 Needless to say, it was
a coup for critics from the right who viewed judicial
discretion and the Parole Commission as unwanted
instruments of leniency.136 The effect of the Act, however, is
central: the Act forced a federal district court’s judicial
discretion to its historical nadir.137 It also began a prolonged
battle between the Government and federal defendants over
various aspects of the relationship between the Guidelines,
the United States Code, and a district court’s discretion—a
battle which continues today.

132. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837 (1984).
133. The other event is the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which is described below.
134. See Newton & Sidhu, supra note 126, at 1175–76.
135. For a thorough and impressive discussion of these matters, see Stith &
Koh, supra note 109.
136. See id. at 223–24 (describing how the Act was initially conceived by liberal
reformers but later morphed into conservative law-and-order legislation).
137. See id. at 270 (describing the Sentencing Reform Act’s “extraordinary
transfer” of discretion from the district court to the Sentencing Commission).
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2. Sentencing under the Mandatory Guidelines (1987–
2005)
a. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
The first United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(Guidelines Manual) went into effect on November 1, 1987.
The new Guidelines, coupled with Congress’s decision to
make them mandatory,138 marked the end of the system of
indeterminate sentencing.139 It was the product of
approximately three years of study, meetings, and review by
the newly formed Sentencing Commission. In many ways,
the Guidelines were a refinement, albeit a good one, of the
prior parole guidelines put into place in 1976. More
importantly, the decisions were now being made by the
Sentencing Commission, not a parole board. Still, even
though discretion over how long a defendant would actually
spend in prison was now back within the judicial branch of
government, it was not given directly to the district courts.
This is because, at their inception, the Guidelines were
predominately binding upon courts.140
b. Judicial Discretion under the Guidelines
Judicial sentencing discretion under the mandatory
Guidelines was limited. By statute, Congress instructed
district courts to impose a sentence within the applicable
Guidelines range “unless there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance” that the Sentencing Commission
did not adequately consider when formulating the
Guidelines.141 Appellate review of sentencing was likewise
limited, primarily serving the oversight function of ensuring
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1988).
139. See Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines,
Judicial Discretion, and Crime, 58 Hastings L.J. 533, 539 (2007) (“Sentencing
guidelines, a form of ‘determinate sentencing,’ emerged as a cure for these
perceived failures of indeterminate sentencing.”).
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005)).
141. Id. § 3553(b).
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that the sentencing court properly calculated the Guidelines
sentencing range.142 But well before the Supreme Court
struck the mandatory Guidelines in Booker, confidence in the
constitutionality of the Guidelines, especially as it related to
judicial discretion, was eroding. This is because the very
process of calculating the Guidelines sentencing range
required a district court to engage in judicial factfinding by
a lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt.143
3. Changing Winds: Growing Skepticism over the Role of
Judicial Factfinding in Sentencing (2000–2005)
The second watershed moment in modern federal
sentencing law was United States v. Booker, in which the
Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory only.144 To
understand Booker, however, one must understand a few
preceding developments. The story of Booker actually begins
five years earlier with Apprendi v. New Jersey.145
a. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In Apprendi, a defendant had pleaded guilty to two
counts of “possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,”
which were each punishable in New Jersey by up to ten years
imprisonment.146 After the defendant pleaded, but before he
was sentenced, the sentencing judge held a hearing inquiring
into the defendant’s motivation for his crime.147 Based on the
court’s judicial factfinding, by a preponderance of the
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1988) (abrogated by United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005)); Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After
Booker, 62 U. M IAMI L. REV . 1115, 1116 (2008).
143. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 6A1.3 cmt. (U.S. S ENTENCING
COMM ’N 2000) (“The Commission believes that use of a preponderance of the
evidence standard is appropriate to meet due process requirements and policy
concerns in resolving disputes regarding application of the guidelines to the facts
of a case.”).
144. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46.
145. See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
146. Id. at 469–70.
147. Id. at 470.
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evidence, that the defendant was motivated by “racial bias,”
the court increased the defendant’s sentencing exposure to
twenty years per count.148 After the court sentenced the
defendant to twelve years imprisonment on one of the counts,
the defendant appealed, under the Due Process Clause, the
court’s method of increasing his statutory maximum.149
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any fact that
increases a crime’s statutory maximum, other than the fact
of a prior conviction,150 must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.151 The Court rooted its holding in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due process, in
conjunction with the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by
jury.152 In doing so, the Court’s holding was a marriage of
earlier decisions in which it had held that due process
“protects the accused against conviction except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged”153 and that
the right to a jury trial entitles a defendant to “a jury
determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt.”154

148. Id. at 470–71.
149. Id. at 471.
150. The “prior conviction” exception refers to the Court’s perennially
controversial holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
151. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
152. Id. at 499–500. Relying on precedent, the Court explained:
We there noted that ‘under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ The
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case
involving a state statute.
Id. at 476 (citation omitted).
153. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
154. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995).
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b. Ring v. Arizona
Two years later, in Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
decided another state case in which a defendant’s sentencing
exposure was increased by post-conviction judicial
factfinding.155 In Ring, a defendant was convicted of felony
murder in Arizona state court.156 Under Arizona law, a felony
murder conviction could only qualify for the death penalty if
one or more aggravating factors accompanied the crime.157
After the defendant’s conviction, but before his sentencing,
the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and made a
finding of two aggravating factors.158 As a result, the court
entered a “special verdict” of death.159 The defendant
challenged his death sentence on Sixth Amendment grounds,
arguing that aggravating factors, that increase sentencing
exposure, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.160
Although the Supreme Court had already approved of
Arizona’s death penalty sentencing scheme a decade earlier
in Walton v. Arizona,161 its approach to the Sixth
Amendment had changed. The rule was now simpler: other
than the fact of a prior conviction, if a factual finding
increases sentencing exposure, it must be found by a jury

155. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002).
156. Id. at 591.
157. Id. at 592.
158. Id. at 594–95.
159. Id. at 594.
160. Id. at 597.
161. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). There the Court said:
If the Constitution does not require that the Enmund finding be proved
as an element of the offense of capital murder, and does not require a
jury to make that finding, we cannot conclude that a State is required to
denominate aggravating circumstances ‘elements’ of the offense or
permit only a jury to determine the existence of such circumstances. We
thus conclude that the Arizona capital sentencing scheme does not
violate the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 649.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. And Arizona’s “aggravating
circumstances” finding violated Apprendi’s rule.162 As a
result, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence
and abrogated its prior holding in Walton.163
c. Blakely v. Washington
Two years after Ring, the Supreme Court once again took
up the issue of a state district court’s discretion to increase a
sentence based on judicial factfinding.164 This time, however,
the district court’s factfinding did not result in a sentence
above the state legislature’s maximum punishment for the
crime; instead, the factfinding merely caused the court to
sentence above the state’s guideline range.165 The result of
Blakely, which considered the interplay between the
legislature’s statutory range and a guidelines-based
sentencing system, would foreshadow how the Court would
approach the Guidelines soon thereafter.
In Blakely, a defendant pleaded guilty to “second-degree
kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a
firearm,”166 which was punishable by up to ten years
imprisonment.167 As part of his plea agreement, the
defendant admitted to the elements of the offense but no
other relevant facts.168 Under a system of indeterminate
sentencing, the state district judge would have had
discretion to sentence the defendant to any term of

162. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding
necessary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years, but not the factfinding
necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment appli es to
both.”)
163. Id. at 603 (“[W]e are persuaded that Walton, in relevant part, cannot
survive the reasoning of Apprendi.”).
164. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
165. Id. at 298–99.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 299.
168. Id.
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imprisonment up to, and including, ten years. Washington
state, however, had put into place a guidelines system that
limited judicial sentencing discretion to a “standard range”
unless the court found “substantial and compelling reasons
justifying an exceptional sentence.”169 Under Washington’s
guidelines, the standard range for the defendant’s offense
was a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months
imprisonment.170 After the defendant’s plea, but before
sentencing, the district court held a three day evidentiary
hearing to gather facts about the defendant’s crime.171
Afterward, the court issued thirty-two findings of fact,
including a determination of “deliberate cruelty.”172 Based on
this determination, the court sentenced the defendant to
ninety months imprisonment.173
Justice Scalia, writing for a narrow majority, expanded
upon the rule of Apprendi by casting a wider definition of
“statutory maximum.” Now, a crime’s statutory maximum
was not just the hard ceiling set by the legislature, but could
be case fact- and case-specific: “[T]he ‘statutory maximum’
for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury
verdict or admitted by the defendant.”174 And when the
district court engaged in factfinding that increased the
defendant’s sentence above the standard range, it violated
Apprendi.175 Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded
for resentencing.176 In her dissent, Justice O’Connor
recognized Blakely’s threat to the Guidelines.177 But just a
169. WASH. REV . CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000).
170. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300.
171. Id. at 300–01.
172. Id. at 298, 300–01.
173. Id. at 298–99.
174. Id. at 303.
175. See id. at 304–05.
176. Id. at 314.
177. Id. at 303. Justice O’Connor noted:
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year later, the momentum of Apprendi would prove too much
to resist.
d. United States v. Booker’s Constitutional Holding
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Booker, which considered the cases of two defendants,
Freddie Booker and Ducan Fanfan, whose sentencing ranges
under the Guidelines were increased as a result of judicial
factfinding.178
Booker was charged with possession of fifty grams or
more of crack cocaine, which had a statutory sentencing
range of ten years to life imprisonment.179 The jury convicted
Booker after considering evidence that he possessed ninetytwo and one-half grams of crack in his duffel bag.180
Combined with Booker’s criminal history, this produced a
Guideline sentencing range of 210 to 262 months
imprisonment.181 At his sentencing hearing, however, the
district court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and
that he had obstructed justice.182 These findings resulted in
a new sentencing range of 360 months to life
imprisonment.183 The district court sentenced Booker, under
the enhanced range, to 360 months imprisonment.184

The consequences of today’s decision will be as far reaching as they are
disturbing. Washington’s sentencing system is by no means unique.
Numerous other States have enacted guidelines systems, as has the
Federal Government. Today’s decision casts constitutional doubt over
them all and, in so doing, threatens an untold number of criminal
judgments.
Id. (citations omitted).
178. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–30 (2005).
179. Id. at 227.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Fanfan was charged with conspiracy to distribute and
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
cocaine,185 which had a statutory sentencing range of five to
forty years imprisonment.186 In arriving at a conviction, the
jury answered “yes” to the question, “Was the amount of
cocaine 500 or more grams?”187 Combined with Fanfan’s
criminal history, the jury’s finding produced a Guideline
sentencing range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months
imprisonment.188 At his sentencing hearing, however, the
district court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that Fanfan possessed two and one-half kilograms of cocaine,
261.6 grams of crack, and had been an organizer-leader of
the criminal scheme.189 These findings resulted in a new
sentencing range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment.190 The
district court, however, heeded Blakely and declined to
impose an increased sentence based on its judicial
factfinding.191
The Court recognized that the cases before it presented
two questions: (1) whether the Apprendi line of cases applied
to the Guidelines; and (2) if so, what portions of the
Guidelines remained in effect.192 Because a different
185. Id. at 228.
186. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2012).
187. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228.
188. United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593, at
*5 (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
189. Booker, 543 U.S. at 228.
190. Id.
191. Fanfan, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18593, at *12–14. The District Judge
stated:
Accordingly, following Blakely, I conclude that it is unconstitutional for
me to apply the federal guideline enhancements in the sentence of
Duncan Fanfan, which is to say, an increase in the drug quantity beyond
that found by the jury, or any role enhancement. To do so would
unconstitutionally impinge upon Mr. Fanfan’s Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial as explained by Blakely.
Id. at *12.
192. Booker, 543 U.S. at 229.
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majority coalesced around the answer to each question,
Booker actually produced two opinions: its constitutional
holding, written by Justice Stevens, to answer the first
question,193 and its remedial holding,194 written by Justice
Breyer, to answer the second question.195
The Court answered the constitutional question in the
affirmative, holding that the Apprendi rule, particularly as
most recently articulated in Blakely, applied to the
Guidelines.196 The Court based its conclusion on the
Guidelines’ mandatory nature. According to the Court, if the
Guidelines were not binding on judges, but advisory only, the
Sixth Amendment implications so central to Apprendi would
disappear.197 As in Blakely, the problem was not resolved
simply by the defendants’ sentences being within the
legislature’s statutory maximum or by the judge having the
authority to depart from the standard range.198 This is
because the mandatory nature of the Guidelines required the
court to engage in judicial factfinding as a prerequisite to an
enhanced sentencing range. Such a requirement impinged
upon the jury’s role of finding any fact (other than a prior
conviction) that raised a sentence above the statutory range,

193. Id. at 230–44.
194. Id. at 244–68 (2005).
195. Id. at 244–68.
196. Id. at 244. In the words of the Court:
Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Apprendi: Any fact (other than
a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding
the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or
a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
197. Id. at 233 (“If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely
advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of
particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not
implicate the Sixth Amendment.”).
198. See id. at 234 (“The availability of a departure in specified circumstances
does not avoid the constitutional issue, just as it did not in Blakely itself.”)
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as defined in Blakely.199 Therefore, the Guidelines, as they
were being applied, violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment
rights.200 The question then became what to do about it.
4. Sentencing Under the Advisory Guidelines (2005–
present)
a. United States v. Booker’s Remedial Holding
In many ways, Booker was the inevitable consequence of
Blakely. The dissenting judges in Blakely saw what was
coming clear enough, which is why the dissents in Blakely
were filled with constructive alternatives to the majority’s
scorched-earth approach.201 Perhaps, the minority judges
reasoned, a compromise could be reached. And the curious
dual-coalition opinion in Booker reflects just that sort of
backroom bargaining,202 which ultimately left the Guidelines
almost fully intact. Much to the chagrin of the justices who
fought to strike down the Guidelines’ determinate sentencing
scheme, the solution was not a bang but a whimper. The
Court would simply excise two statutes that governed the
application of the Guidelines: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),203
199. See id. at 244.
200. See id. at 244–45.
201. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 330–40 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
202. See Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal
Sentencing, 39 V AL. U. L. REV . 693, 716–17 (2005).
203. The statute states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence
of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless
the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.
In determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken into
consideration, the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines,
policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing
Commission. In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the
court shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the
purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the absence of an applicable
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which made the Guidelines mandatory, and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e),204 which governed appellate review of sentencing.

sentencing guideline in the case of an offense other than a petty offense,
the court shall also have due regard for the relationship of the sentence
imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar
offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2018).
204. The statue states:
Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether
the sentence—
(1) was imposed in violation of law;
(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the
sentencing guidelines;
(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and
(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of
reasons required by section 3553(c) [18 USCS § 3553(c)];
(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range
based on a factor that—
(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section
3553(a)(2) [18 USCS § 3553(a)(2)]; or
(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b) [18 USCS
§ 3553(b)]; or
(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or
(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the
applicable guidelines range, having regard for the factors to be
considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section
3553(a) of this title [18 USCS § 3553(a)] and the reasons for the
imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district
court pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c) [18 USCS
§ 3553(c)]; or
(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous
and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or
(3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court’s application of the
guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under subsection
(3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district
court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.
Id. § 3742(e).
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Everything else remained the same, including judicial
factfinding. But now judicial factfinding, even when it
increased the Guidelines sentencing range, was authorized
because, according to the Court, advisory Guidelines do not
present Sixth Amendment concerns.205
b. The Three-Step Sentencing Process
After Booker, federal district courts follow a three-step
process when sentencing a defendant. First, courts properly
determine the applicable advisory sentencing range under
the Guidelines.206 Second, courts consider the applicability of
any departure provisions within the Guidelines.207 Third,
courts consider the statutory sentencing factors codified in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),208 which include the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant,209 to impose a sentence
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with
the statutory sentencing purposes.210 As is clear on its
surface, this process continues to give significant weight to
the Guidelines. And over time, since Booker, the role of the
Guidelines has continued to increase.
B. More Than a Decade after Booker: The Present Role of
the Guidelines in Federal Sentencing
When the Supreme Court salvaged the Guidelines by

205. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. (“If the Guidelines as currently written could be
read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”).
206. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.1(a) (U.S. S ENTENCING
COMM ’N 2016). See also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (“The
sentencing judge, as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the
presentence report and its interpretation of the Guidelines.”).
207. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1B1.1(b).
208. Id. § 1B1.1(c).
209. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018).
210. Id.
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rendering them advisory, it failed to appreciate fully the role
that the Guidelines would continue to play in federal
sentencing. When the Supreme Court held years later, in
Beckles, that the Guidelines are not subject to vagueness
challenges, it grossly understated what was then known
about the Guidelines’ continued influence after Booker.
These shortcomings led the Court to render a holding that
was fundamentally dissonant with the realities of federal
sentencing.
Booker did not return the federal sentencing scheme to
indeterminacy, as Beckles at times suggests.211 It was
instead a compromise opinion 212 that left the Guidelines
intact. It also allowed the Guidelines to continue to guide
district court’s sentencing practices just as before. As one
recent commentator has observed, after Booker “there is good
reason to believe that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are,
at best, extremely influential on sentencing and, at worst,
effectively binding.”213
According to Sentencing Commission data and analysis,
federal sentencing practices changed very little as a result of
Booker. For example, according to the Sentencing
Commission’s 2012 “Booker Report,” the average sentence—
for all federal offenders across all jurisdictions—from 1996 to
2003 was forty-nine months; the average sentence from 2007
to 2011 was also forty-nine months.214 Comparing these
same two periods, the percentage of federal sentences that
were within-Guidelines or below-Guidelines based on a

211. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017) (explaining that
the Guidelines “merely guide the district courts’ discretion” but “do not constrain
that discretion”).
212. It is widely believed that Justice Ginsburg “defected” from the dissent in
Booker’s remedial opinion to the majority in order to salvage the Guidelines. See,
e.g., Klein, supra note 202, at 716–17.
213. V eronica Saltzman, Note, Redefining Violence in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 55 HARV . J. ON LEGIS. 525, 532 (2018).
214. U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL S ENTENCING 58 (2012).

OF

UNITED

2018]

THE ORWELL COURT

1055

Government-sponsored motion was 83.9% before Booker and
80.7% after Booker.215 Since the Booker Report, the
Sentencing Commission has reported a slight decrease in
these numbers, with 78.6% of sentences from fiscal years
2011 to 2015 either within-Guidelines or below-Guidelines
based on a Government motion.216 This data demonstrates
that Booker’s practical effect has proved marginal.
This practical reality was also by the Supreme Court’s
design. In Booker, the Court held that sentencing courts
must continue to “consider” the properly calculated
Guidelines sentencing range.217 Later, in Pepper v. United
States, the Court clarified that sentencing courts owe the
Guidelines “respectful consideration.”218 Still later, in
Molina-Martinez v. United States, the Court explained, “the
Guidelines are not only the starting point for most federal
sentencing proceedings but also the lodestar.”219
After Booker, sentencing courts are not only still charged
with consideration of the Guidelines, but it is reversible error
if they misinterpret or misapply a Guidelines provision, or
miscalculate the proper Guidelines sentencing range.220

215. Id.
216. U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N, FIGURE G: COMPARISON OF S ENTENCE IMPOSED
POSITION OF S ENTENCE RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE BY YEAR (2015)
(available
at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2015/FigureG.pdf) (last visited
Nov. 17, 2018).
AND

217. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (requiring
sentencing courts to consider Guidelines ranges).
218. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S 475, 476 (2011).
219. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1346 (2016).
220. See United States v. Olarte-Rojas, 820 F.3d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 2016) The
Fifth Circuit explained:
While the Guidelines are advisory in light of United States v. Booker,
district courts still must properly calculate the applicable guidelines
range before imposing a sentence. The incorrect application of the
Guidelines that results in an erroneous calculation of the total offense
level and the guidelines sentencing range is an obvious error or mistake
that almost certainly would result in a remand.
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Additionally, if a court’s sentencing varies outside the
properly calculated Guidelines range, it is reversible error to
not state a good reason for doing so.221 Moreover, after
Booker, courts of appeals are charged with reviewing all
sentences, whether within the Guidelines range or not, for
substantive reasonableness.222 But only sentences outside
the properly calculated Guidelines range are reviewed
without a presumption of reasonableness.223 Additionally, an
appellate court will review for substantive reasonableness
the degree to which a sentencing court upwardly varies
above the advisory Guidelines range.224
All of these observations rebut the Court’s erroneous
claim in Beckles that the post-Booker Guidelines “merely
guide the district courts’ discretion” but “do not constrain
that discretion.”225 In fact, as illustrated above, the
Guidelines, both before and after Booker, dramatically
constrain a district court’s sentencing discretion. And
because the holding in Beckles rested squarely on the Court’s
misplaced view of post-Booker sentencing discretion, the
holding that the Guidelines are not vulnerable to vagueness
challenges is equally misplaced.

Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2018) (requiring sentencing courts to properly
calculate the applicable Guidelines range).
221. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–58 (2007) (“Sometimes the
circumstances will call for a brief explanation; sometimes they will call for a
lengthier explanation. Where the judge imposes a sentence outside the
Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done so.”). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(c)(2) (requiring a sentencing court to state a “specific reason” for a
sentence outside the Guidelines range).
222. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2007) (explaining
that even a within-Guidelines sentence is subject to reasonableness review).
223. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“If the sentence is within
the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a
presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines
range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness.”).
224. Id. at 46–47 (“In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence outside the
Guidelines range, appellate courts may therefore take the degree of variance into
account and consider the extent of deviation from the Guidelines.”).
225. Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017).
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C. An Evolving View of the Role of the Guidelines in
Sentencing: The Uneasy Relationship between Beckles
and United States v. Peugh
Not only is Beckles misguided in its understanding of the
role of the Guidelines after Booker, its reasoning is also at
odds with a recent predecessor opinion, United States v.
Peugh.226 In Peugh, decided in 2013, the Court analyzed
whether the advisory Guidelines were subject to a different
constitutional concern: the Ex Post Facto Clause.227
The United States Constitution prohibits Congress, as
well as the states, from passing ex post facto laws.228 The
Supreme Court has defined “ex post facto laws” as including
“[e]very law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime,
when committed.”229 As the Sentencing Commission
promulgates new Guidelines, which it does nearly every
year, the advisory sentencing range for the same offender
sometimes increases between the time he committed the
crime and the time he is sentenced. Such was the case for
Marvin Peugh.
Peugh was in the agriculture business, holding a stake
in two companies: one bought, stored, and sold grain; the
other provided farming services to landowners and
tenants.230 When Peugh and his business partner fell behind
financially, they attempted to stay afloat by engaging in a
scheme of bank fraud and “check kiting.”231 The scheme
eventually came to light and, around ten years after the
commission of the offense, a jury convicted Peugh of five
226. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013).
227. Id. at 532–33.
228. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed [by
Congress].”); U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto
Law.”).
229. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798).
230. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 533.
231. Id.
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counts of bank fraud.232 The district court calculated Peugh’s
advisory sentencing range at seventy to eighty-seven months
imprisonment under the version of the Guidelines in effect
at the time of sentencing.233 Peugh objected, arguing that his
advisory sentencing range should be thirty-seven to forty-six
months imprisonment, which it would have been under the
version of the Guidelines in effect at the time he committed
the offense.234 The district court overruled Peugh’s objection
and sentenced him to seventy months imprisonment.235 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed, following its own precedent that
the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply to the advisory
Guidelines.236
On review, the Supreme Court began its analysis by
establishing that the ex post facto inquiry depends on
“whether a given change in law presents a ‘sufficient risk of
increasing the measure of punishment attached to the
covered crimes.’”237 While the Court had previously held in
Miller v. Florida that the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to the
Florida guidelines’ scheme,238 some federal courts of appeals,
such as the Seventh Circuit, later interpreted Booker to
undercut Miller’s application to the federal Guidelines on the
basis “that ‘Booker demoted the Guidelines from rules to
advice.’”239 In response to this sentiment, the Court outlined

232. Peugh committed the offenses in 1999 and 2000; he was sentenced in May
2010. Id. at 533–34.
233. Id. at 534.
234. Id. at 533–34.
235. Id. at 534–35.
236. United States v. Peugh, 675 F.3d 736, 741 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We, however,
stand by [our prior precedent’s] reasoning—the advisory nature of the guidelines
vitiates any ex post facto problem—and again decline the invitation to overrule
it.”), rev’d, 569 U.S. 530 (2013).
237. Peugh, 569 U.S. at 539 (2013) (quoting Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 250
(2000)).
238. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430–36 (1987).
239. United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 793–94 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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the central role that even the post-Booker, advisory
Guidelines continue to play in federal sentencing.240 Based
on this role, the Court reversed, concluding that “altering the
substantive ‘formula’ used to calculate the applicable
sentencing range” poses a “significant risk”241 of inflicting a
greater punishment—even when the range is technically
advisory only.242
In reaching its holding in Peugh, the Court soundly
rejected the notion that the Guidelines offer mere guidance,
or “advice,” to the district court. Justice Sotomayor, writing
for the majority, took particular issue with the Government
analogizing the Guidelines to a policy paper:
While the Government accurately describes several attributes of federal
sentencing after Booker, the conclusion it draws by isolating these
features of the system is ultimately not supportable. On the
Government’s account, the Guidelines are just one among many
persuasive sources a sentencing court can consult, no different from a
“policy paper.” The Government’s argument fails to acknowledge,
however, that district courts are not required to consult any policy paper
in order to avoid reversible procedural error; nor must they “consider the
extent of [their] deviation” from a given policy paper and “ensure that
the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the
variance.” Courts of appeals, in turn, are not permitted to presume that
a sentence that comports with a particular policy paper is reasonable;
nor do courts of appeals, in considering whether the district court’s
sentence was reasonable, weigh the extent of any departure from a given
policy paper in determining whether the district court abused its
discretion. It is simply not the case that the Sentencing Guidelines are
merely a volume that the district court reads with academic interest in
the course of sentencing.243

This passage reflects an appreciation for post-Booker
precedent and sentencing practices that informs a holistic
view of the Guidelines’ role in sentencing. But Peugh was a

240. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 541–42 (“The post-Booker federal sentencing
scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are
anchored by the Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark
through the process of appellate review.”).
241. Id. at 550–51 (citations omitted).
242. See id. at 546–50.
243. Id. at 548–49 (citations omitted).
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close decision and the dissenting Justices had a different
perspective.
In the Peugh dissent, Justice Thomas, Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito took a narrower, less-holistic
view of the role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing.244 To
the dissenting Justices, the answer was simple: the advisory
nature of the post-Booker Guidelines renders the Guidelines
impotent, in and of themselves, to “alter the punishment
affixed” to an offender’s crime.245 This is so, for two reasons:
(1) because the Guidelines “do not constrain the discretion of
district courts,” they “have no legal effect on a defendant’s
sentence;” and (2) even if the Guidelines do create a risk of a
harsher punishment, “that risk results from the Guidelines’
persuasive force, not any legal effect.”246 The dissenting
Justices subscribed to the Seventh Circuit’s characterization
of Booker as transforming the Guidelines “from law to
advice,” stating that, after Booker, the Guidelines “merely
influence[] the exercise of the sentencing judge’s
discretion.”247 The dissent concluded by treating Booker as a
return to indeterminate sentencing: because the statutory
sentencing range remained the same from the time of the
offense to the time of sentencing, and because the advisory
Guidelines sentencing range does not “affix” a punishment,
Peugh’s sentencing under the newer Guidelines did not
offend the Ex Post Facto Clause.248
By comparison, Peugh’s majority and dissenting opinions
fundamentally differ in their view of a district court’s
discretion under the advisory Guidelines. The difference can
be summed up in a single question: Is discretion a matter of
degree or is it black-and-white? Put differently: Is the
discretionary nature of the advisory Guidelines a return to
244. See id. at 551–57, 563 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. See id. at 551.
246. Id. at 551–52.
247. Id. at 552–55.
248. See id.
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indeterminate sentencing? The answer to these questions
appears to determine the outcome of all constitutionality
questions with respect to the Guidelines. Just as with Peugh,
this view determined the outcome in Beckles. But this time,
the majority and minority views of the role of the Guidelines
in post-Booker sentencing had reversed.
In terms of counting noses, the radical change in the view
of the Guidelines from Peugh to Beckles was due to two
circumstances: Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer moved
camps and joined the majority, and Justice Kagan did not
participate in the consideration or decision in Beckles.249 This
resulted in effectively a 5-2 split in Beckles over what role the
Guidelines play in federal sentencing. This also resulted in a
radically different answer to the question. Gone was the
holistic view and weight of statistical data; in was a black
and white view of judicial discretion. In this sense, which is
fundamental, Peugh and Beckles are irreconcilable.
Perhaps aware of this criticism, Justice Thomas, writing
for the majority in Beckles, strained to comport Beckles with
Peugh. He asserted that Peugh was still good law but narrow
in its holding.250 He argued that vagueness in the Eighth
Amendment context is different from vagueness under the
Due Process Clause.251 Finally, he explained that the
Guidelines are not “entirely immune” from scrutiny under
the Due Process Clause.252 But it is difficult to see how the

249. See Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 889 (2017).
250. See id. at 894–96 (“Our holding today does not render the advisory
Guidelines immune from constitutional scrutiny. . . . But the void-for-vagueness
and ex post facto inquiries are ‘analytically distinct.’”) (citations omitted).
251. Id. Justice Thomas explained:
The Court has also recognized ‘in the Eighth Amendment context’ that
a district court’s reliance on a vague sentencing factor in a capital case,
even indirectly, ‘can taint the sentence.’ But our approach to vagueness
under the Due Process Clause is not interchangeable with ‘the rationale
of our cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.’
Id. at 895–96. (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 896 (“Finally, our holding today also does not render ‘sentencing
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past cases cited in Beckles could be decided the same given
the Court’s evolved view of the role of the Guidelines. For
example, Justice Thomas already stated in his dissent in
Peugh that he believed Peugh was decided wrongly.253
There’s no reason to see why any other cases dealing with
constitutionality and the Guidelines, from Beckles forward,
would elicit a different response.
IV. E SCAPING ROOM 101: RECOMMENDATIONS TO MITIGATE
THE HARMS C REATED BY B ECKLES AND OTHER R ELATED
DECISIONS
Circuit courts, inspired by Beckles, have begun to take
constitutional questions surrounding federal sentencing law
in previously unforeseeable directions. In United States v.
Sanchez-Rojas, for example, the Eighth Circuit has held that
when
the
Guidelines
merely
cross-reference
an
unconstitutional statute, the statute is no longer
unconstitutional for Guidelines purposes.254 The Fifth
Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v.
Godoy.255 The rationale for Sanchez-Rojas and Godoy lies
beyond the holding of Beckles but is perhaps not inconsistent
with Beckles’s underlying reasoning, specifically its view of
the role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing. This is now
the landscape that the courts have created, one in which the
procedure[s]’ entirely ‘immune from scrutiny under the due process clause.’ We
hold only that the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, including § 4B1.2(a)’s residual
clause, are not subject to a challenge under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.”)
(citations omitted).
253. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 560–63 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254. United States v. Sanchez-Rojas, 889 F.3d 950, 952 (8th Cir. 2018)
(“Applying the Beckles/Johnson reasoning here, Sanchez-Rojas cannot maintain
his vagueness challenge against U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). We see no meaningful
difference between a Guidelines section that uses the same language as a statute
(like § 4B1.2(a)(2)) and a section that incorporates the statutory language by
reference (like § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)).”).
255. See United States v. Godoy, 890 F.3d 531, 537–38 (5th Cir. 2018) (“The
Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges. So it does not necessarily
follow from Dimaya that § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in the Guidelines
context.”).
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decisions of the Sentencing Commission will be
incrementally inoculated from constitutional concerns. To be
sure, it only gets more Orwellian from here. But it does not
have to be. In fact, there are concrete steps that those
involved in criminal law—the Sentencing Commission,
Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar—can take to begin
to right the ship and mitigate some of the harms and
injustices created by the Court in Beckles.
A. The United States Sentencing Commission
As explained above, the Sentencing Commission, as the
promulgator of the Guidelines, plays an extraordinarily large
role in federal sentencing. Larger, in fact, than a majority on
the Supreme Court is currently willing to recognize. As a
district court’s interpretation and application of the
Guidelines has become more insulated from review
(especially as it relates to constitutional concerns) than a
court’s treatment of statutory authority, it is incumbent
upon the Sentencing Commission to work diligently to avoid
constitutional problems even in the absence of congressional
or judicial direction. The Sentencing Commission should do
so in three ways, each of which would serve to promote the
Sentencing Commission’s policy objective of “just
punishment” as well as to ameliorate its concerns over
judicial economy.256
First, the Sentencing Commission should remove any
language from the Guidelines that is similar to (or the same
as) statutory language struck as unconstitutional. Thus far,
the Commission has been extremely effective and proactive
in doing so. Most notably, in Amendment 798, the Sentencing
Commission deleted the career offender residual clause “as a
256. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 1A1.2 (U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N
2018) (“The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 . . . provides for the development of
guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act
delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize the federal
sentencing process.”) (emphasis added).
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matter of policy,” citing Johnson and judicial economy.257
This was the correct decision, on both grounds, and the
Sentencing Commission should remain vigilant in
identifying any future opportunities to make similar
amendments as expeditiously as possible.
Second, the Sentencing Commission should remove any
cross-reference to a statute that has been held
unconstitutional, or expressly excuse from the crossreference the unconstitutional portion. Because some
circuits are using Beckles to hold that unconstitutional
statutes remain in effect for Guidelines purposes when
incorporated by cross-reference,258 it is solely up to the
Sentencing Commission to decide whether problematic
language remains.
Third, the Sentencing Commission should expressly
declare retroactive any amendments removing potentially
unconstitutional language. By its own terms, Amendment
798 only applied to offenders who were sentenced after
August 1, 2016, foreclosing relief for many offenders on
collateral review.259 While the retroactive application of the
Guidelines is eventually a decision for the judiciary, one
factor courts consider is whether the Sentencing Commission
expressly intended the Amendment to apply retroactively.260

257. Id. app. C, Supp., amend. 798. The Guidelines Manual states:
The Commission determined that the residual clause at § 4B1.2
implicates many of the same concerns cited by the Supreme Court in
Johnson, and, as a matter of policy, amends § 4B1.2(a)(2) to strike the
clause. Removing the residual clause has the advantage of alleviating
the considerable application difficulties associated with that clause, as
expressed by judges, probation officers, and litigants . Furthermore,
removing the clause will alleviate some of the ongoing litigation and
uncertainty resulting from the Johnson decision.
Id.
258. E.g., Godoy, 890 F.3d at 537–38; Sanchez-Rojas, 889 F.3d at 952.
259. See U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798 (the
Amendment became effective on August 1, 2016).
260. United States v. Huff, 370 F.3d 454, 465–67 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that courts look to the Commission’s express statements on retroactivity but do
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An affirmative statement of retroactivity, even if ultimately
uneventful, would at least lend some credence to the
arguments of a defendant whose offense level was increased
as a result of constitutionally questionable language.
B. Congress
Baked into the concept of a mandatory minimum is a
one-size-fits-all approach to sentencing. This can be a
problem that is further intensified when Congress includes
catch-all provisions, such as a residual clause, in mandatory
minimum statutes. The solution to the problems posed by
residual clauses specifically, and a one-size-fits-all approach
generally, is to abandon such approaches altogether and
allow district judges to make sentencing decisions—in
consultation with the Guidelines—on a case by case basis.
This was the case for much of the history of federal
sentencing, before Congress began passing mandatory
minimum recidivism statutes in the mid-1980s. And these
statutes have created problems ever since, dramatically
increasing our prison population and giving the courts
enormous difficulties in weighing their application.261 This is
part of the reason the Sentencing Commission has drifted
away from residual clauses, and to an extent, priorconviction-enhancement provisions.262 In this respect,
Congress should follow the Sentencing Commission’s lead.
Short of abandoning mandatory minimum recidivism
statutes altogether, Congress should take additional steps to
inject clarity into its prior-conviction enhancement
not treat them as binding).
261. See Matthew C. Lamb, Note, A Return to Rehabilitation: Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing in an Era of Mass Incarceration, 41 NOTRE DAME J. LEGIS .
126, 132–34 (2015).
262. U.S. S ENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL app. C, Supp., amend. 798
(“Removing the residual clause has the advantage of alleviating the considerable
application difficulties associated with that clause, as expressed by judges,
probation officers, and litigants. Furthermore, removing the clause will alleviate
some of the ongoing litigation and uncertainty resulting from the Johnson
decision.”).
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provisions in order to reduce unnecessary litigation.
Congress should do so in three ways. First, it should include
a definition for each enumerated offense, even if simply
copied from courts’ generic definitions. Although the courts
have done most of this work by now, a statutory definition
would prevent new definitional questions from arising.
Second, Congress should revise all “elements” clauses to
clearly state the mens rea and degree of force required to
satisfy the clause. This would settle many ongoing disputes
among the circuits.263 And third, Congress should remove all
residual clauses from the United States Code, whether
courts have deemed them unconstitutional or not.264 While
Congress would not ordinarily need to remove a residual
clause once a court has declared it unconstitutional, some
circuits are now actually using Congress’s inaction to infer
an intent to revive an unconstitutional statute for some
applications.265
C. The Courts
Although no federal judge would admit to a results
oriented approach to sentencing law, many decisions betray
this species of judicial activism. Such decisions can come in
obvious forms, such as unusually narrow or counterintuitive
interpretations of statutes, Guidelines, and binding

263. The circuits remain entrenched in extrapolating the full implications of
two Supreme Court decisions. E.g., V oisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272
(2016) (dealing with the mens rea required under the same type of clause);
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (dealing with the degree of physical
force required to satisfy an “elements” clause).
264. The obvious current example is 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (2018), which is
nearly identical in wording to the residual clause the Court struck in Sessions v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Godoy, 890 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir. 2018)
(“Section 16(b) remains on the books, not purged from existence—at least for
confined uses. And until Congress acts or we are presented with binding
authority to the contrary, § 16(b) remains incorporated into the advisory-only
Guidelines for definitional purposes.”).
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precedent.266 They can also come in subtler forms, such as a
systematic refusal to engage in substantive reasonableness
review of terms of imprisonment.267 Three adaptations would
improve the current system. First, judges must take a
consistent, principled approach to sentencing law that is
outcome blind. Second, judges must reconsider sentencing
decisions not as administrative problems but as justice
solutions. Third, courts must begin to engage in meaningful
substantive
reasonableness
review.
This
third
recommendation warrants some additional elaboration.
As part of Booker’s remedial holding, the Supreme Court
elevated reasonableness review, which may or may not have
previously existed in any meaningful way,268 to a primary
appellate concern about sentencing.269 At the time, the role
that reasonableness review would actually play was in
dispute. The remedial majority was optimistic, predicting
that circuit courts would “prove capable” of “applying the
standard.”270 The dissent, on the other hand, was alarmist,
predicting that reasonableness review would “produce a
discordant symphony” and “wreak havoc” on courts.271 Both
were wrong: substantive reasonableness review entered with

266. See id.
267. See Note, More than a Formality: the Case for Meaningful Substantive
Reasonableness Review, 127 HARV . L. REV . 951, 959–61 (2014) [hereinafter More
than a Formality].
268. The majority believed it did exist, United States v. Booker, 534 U.S. 220,
262 (2005) (“‘Reasonableness’ standards are not foreign to sentencing law.”),
while the dissent believed it did not exist, id. at 310 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[S]entences within the Guidelines range have not previously been reviewed for
reasonableness. Indeed, the very concept . . . finds no support in statutory
language or established practice of the last two decades.”).
269. Id. at 262–64 (majority opinion).
270. Id. (explaining that contrary to Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion,
“appellate judges will prove capable” of applying the reasonableness standard).
271. Id. at 312–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that “‘unreasonableness’
review will produce a discordant symphony of different standards, varying from
court to court and judge to judge, giving the lie to the remedial majority’s
sanguine claim that ‘no feature’ of its avant-garde Guidelines system will ‘ten[d]
to hinder’ the avoidance of ‘excessive sentencing disparities’”) (citations omitted).
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a whisper. In fact, it is rarely used in any meaningful
sense.272 Several circuit judges, for example, have publicly
stated that substantive reasonableness review “defies
appellate explanation,” is unprincipled, a “waste of time,”
and “has essentially become no appellate review.”273 But this
does not have to be so.
The Supreme Court can, in one or two cases,
dramatically advance substantive reasonableness review.
First, it should provide clear principles that appellate courts
should
consider
when
evaluating
substantive
reasonableness. Second, it should reverse Rita v. United
States, in which the Court held that an appellate court may
impose a presumption of reasonableness on withinGuidelines sentences but may not impose a presumption of
unreasonableness on sentences outside the advisory
Guidelines range.274 This undercuts reasonableness review
by failing to energize the principle that district courts should
only vary outside the advisory Guidelines range when they
have a good reason for doing so.275 Even after Booker, that
principle is sound but lacks reinforcement. This would build
on the three substantive reasonableness recommendations
by the Sentencing Commission in its 2012 Booker Report to
“[d]evelop more robust substantive appellate review”: (1)
require a presumption of reasonableness for withinGuidelines sentences; (2) require more justification for
sentences outside the advisory Guidelines range; and (3)

272. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has only ever vacated one sentence on
substantive reasonableness grounds, in United States v. Chandler, 732 F.3d 434
(5th Cir. 2013).
273. See More than a Formality, supra note 267, at 959–60.
274. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 355–56 (2007) (“The fact that we
permit courts of appeals to adopt a presumption of reasonableness does not mean
that courts may adopt a presumption of unreasonableness.”).
275. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007) (“It is also clear that a
district judge must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from
the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an
unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient
justifications.”).
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require heightened review of sentences that are based on
policy disagreements with the Guidelines.276
D. The Criminal Bar
Nearly every case that reaches the United States
Supreme Court—whether Peugh, Johnson, Welch, or
Beckles—began with an objection before the district court.
The case then proceeded with a well-reasoned and wellargued appeal. Finally, an attorney introduced the case to
the Supreme Court, likely in a terse but thoughtful petition
for writ of certiorari. These are the ingredients for good
lawyering and for moving the law in a beneficial direction.
And while no single ingredient is sufficient, all are necessary.
As the arc of the moral universe slowly bends, criminal
attorneys (defense attorneys and prosecutors alike) can help
point it toward justice. It is needed now as much as ever.
V. CONCLUSION
The story of Booker, Peugh, Johnson, and Beckles is
multilayered. On the surface, it tells of the Supreme Court
working both to identify the constitutional vulnerabilities of
the Guidelines and to explore how the analysis changed
when the Guidelines transitioned from mandatory to
advisory. On a deeper level, however, it tells of two
competing narratives about the impact of Booker and the
present role of the advisory Guidelines. As the dissenting
narrative overtook the majority narrative, most notably in
Beckles, both the past and the present were, in a real way,
rewritten. As a result, similarly situated defendants suffered
divergent outcomes. And it does not end there. Now, in light
of the new narrative, circuit courts are blazing more puzzling
trails, eroding the ideals of consistency, uniformity, and, at
the end of the day, fairness. But there is hope: the Sentencing
Commission, Congress, the courts, and the criminal bar can
276. U.S. S ENTENCING COMM ’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL S ENTENCING 111–12 (2012).

OF
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respond to guide federal sentencing practice back toward a
more principled place where things are what they seem. This
is a worthwhile pursuit that is necessary to restore a
semblance of justice to the often vexing world of federal
sentencing law.

